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IT'S ALL IN THE ATMOSPHERE
LAWRENCE J. FOX*
I. LAWYER FOR THE FIDUCIARY
rIE rain continued into a second day and the low-lying clouds
1L created a depressing blanket of gloom that even New York City,
dressed in its holiday best for Christmas, could not overcome. Perhaps
the accompanying low barometric pressure explains the unusual, dis-
turbing, and wrong-headed result that was reached that Sunday morning
by the group assembled for the Conference on Ethical Issues in Repre-
senting Older Clients. But whatever the reason, by 9:30 a.m. the hand-
picked delegates had not only jettisoned the principle that fiduciaries are
entitled to effective representation from their lawyers, but also endorsed a
larger principle that will (a) turn lawyers into policemen for their clients,
(b) create an irreconcilable conflict of interest between the lawyer's duties
to her client and the lawyer's newly created duties to third parties, and
(c) increase the potential that lawyers will be held liable for the transgres-
sions of their clients.
The proposal that was adopted reads as follows:
A lawyer representing older persons must recognize that the fiduciary,
not the beneficiary, is the client and is the party to whom a duty is
owed. The lawyer has only derivative duties to the beneficiary as a
result of the representation of the fiduciary.... A lawyer for a fiduci-
ary acting in any fiduciary capacity may communicate otherwise confi-
dential information to a court having jurisdiction and to parties to
whom the fiduciary owes duties. Disclosures relating to those duties
are impliedly authorized by MRPC 1.6(a) in order to carry out the
representation. I
Why should the bar get so exercised about this proposal? The image
of the poor helpless beneficiaries about to suffer untold damage at the
hands of the errant fiduciary, saved at the last minute by the receipt of a
warning from the heroine lawyer for the fiduciary can generate warm
fuzzy feelings and provide the hope of improving the public's image of
the profession. But these salutary effects, as tempting as they may be,
come at a cost-a cost so huge that it would redefine the fundamental
notion of lawyering.
* Mr. Fox, a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania & the University of Penn-
sylvania Law School, is a managing partner of Drinker, Biddle & Reath. He is a member
of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and Vice-
Chair of the ABA Section on Litigation.
1. See Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients, Recommenda-
tions of the Conference, in Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients, 62 Fordham L.
Rev. 989, 997-98 (1994) [hereinafter Recommendations].
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A. The Client's Viewpoint
The proposal should be considered first from the point of view of the
fiduciary. Having been appointed trustee in a world fraught with legal
minefields, only the truly ignorant would proceed without hiring counsel
to negotiate the treacherous terrain. But the proposal adopted in the
shadow of the Metropolitan Opera House2 would assure that if the
trustee hired counsel, the counsel she would get would be driving not an
armored, all-terrain vehicle but rather a tippy golf cart providing little or
no protection to its occupant. Instead of counsel who would explain to
her client that everything learned in the representation would remain
confidential, this client would be told that anything told to counsel could
and would be used against the trustee because the counsel would feel free
"to communicate otherwise confidential information to a court having
jurisdiction, and to parties to whom the fiduciary owes duties." 3 So,
instead of this hapless trustee being in a position to share her hopes,
dreams, fears, plans, and questions with her counsel, this trustee would
be placed in the position where she would have to worry everytime she
met with counsel that counsel might run to the beneficiaries to tell them
what the trustee was considering. Indeed, the proposal is so open-ended
that the disclosures counsel for the trustees could make would even
include "Do you know what your trustee said about you?" or "Do you
know what thought the trustee shared with me?" In this context, the
most important question raised by the proposal is this: if counsel for the
trustee is free to act in this manner, where does the trustee get the real
counsel to which she is clearly entitled? If each counsel hired by the
trustee is automatically subject to the duty to disclose to the beneficiaries
that is contemplated by the proposal, there is no escape from the trustee
trap.
B. The Lawyer's Viewpoint
The analysis from the point of view of the attorney is equally dismal.
The lawyer is denied full consultation with the client. Because the client
understands what happens if information is shared, the flow of
information is cut off and the lawyer loses the opportunity to remonstrate
with the client, one of the more valuable benefits confidentiality confers
on the profession. But the proposal also creates additional mischief. If
this rule were adopted as an amendment to Model Rule 1.6, it would
create significant liability exposure for counsel. In a world in which law-
yers are sued with ever increasing frequency, the fact that a lawyer had
the discretion to disclose confidential information, and did not, will be no
defense to the claim that if the lawyer had disclosed confidential informa-
tion some harm or other could have been prevented. Thus, the proposed
2. This is technically a lie. The Metropolitan Opera House is due north of Fordham
Law School.
3. See Recommendations, supra note 1, at 998.
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rule has an even more Draconian effect on undermining the lawyer-client
relationship than would first appear. Because intelligent lawyers inter-
ested in their self-preservation will not simply contemplate whether a cli-
ent secret should be disclosed, the rule, despite its use of soft language
like "may," will be read as requiring disclosure in all instances.
There is no doubt that the proposal springs from the best of intentions.
The lawyers who proffer it are seeking to protect the interests of the trust
or the poor helpless beneficiaries thereof, a noble endeavor indeed. The
problem is that, in fashioning the solution, they have ignored the
interests of the one person who is entitled to the greatest protection from
the lawyer: the lawyer's client. This problem could easily be avoided, of
course, by implementing a policy that the confidentiality-destroying pro-
ponents ignore. The lawyer can represent the trust or the beneficiaries
and so inform the trustee. Then, the trustee, if she thinks she needs
separate counsel, either generally or on a particular matter, can retain
her own counsel who, freed from duties to anyone other than her client,
can provide the confidential advice to which the trustee is entitled.
C. The Effect on the Profession
This proposal also must be viewed as part of a much larger and more
insidious problem. The world is filled with fiduciaries. They are trustees
of trusts, executors of wills, directors of corporations (both non-profit
and for profit), guardians of children and incompetents, and lawyers for
class representatives. These fiduciaries all, by definition, owe duties to
beneficiaries, shareholders, wards, and absent class members.
An endless clamor, led by no less a luminary than Harris Weinstein,
recent Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision, asserts that the
obligations of lawyers for these fiduciaries should be seriously altered to
take into account the fiduciaries' obligations to individuals and even the
government.4 But this effort, whether it is put forth by those who wish to
protect helpless trust beneficiaries or by the guardians of the federal
deposit insurance plan, must be resisted for two critical reasons. First,
simply because a fiduciary owes a duty to a beneficiary does not mean a
lawyer for the fiduciary owes duties to the beneficiary as well. The
lawyer's duties, absent the generally recognized exceptions,5 should be
only to his client. Otherwise, the lawyer suffers from the very conflicts of
interest Model Rule 1.7 was designed to avoid. If the lawyer owes duties
to the trustee and the trustee's interests diverge from the interests of the
beneficiaries, the lawyer should not be forced to choose or compromise
the duties he owes to the trustee. Suggesting that the duties of the client
become the duties of the lawyer, however, achieves precisely this result.
4. For a more detailed discussion of Weinstein's argument, see Lawrence J. Fox,
OTS v. Kaye Scholer: An Assault on the Citadel, 48 Bus. Law. 1521, 1523-1525 (1993).
5. Lawyers may not lie or mislead, aid and abet a client violation of law, or violate
the criminal law. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(d) & cmt. Ir" 6-9
(1993); Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(7) & EC 7-5 (1993).
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Second, lawyers should not be held liable for the transgressions of their
clients. The law places fiduciary obligations on the person or persons
who are obliged to fulfill the role of fiduciary. If the fiduciary fails to
fulfill the obligations, the fiduciary should be held liable. However, so
long as the lawyer does not aid and abet, only the client should be held
liable for client transgressions. Yet, the proposed rule expands lawyer
liability in precisely this way. All the lawyer need know is some fact that
might suggest or raise suspicion regarding a client misdeed and the
lawyer's failure to breach confidentiality or otherwise deter or prevent
the transgression will result in lawyer liability.
The position of trustee was established to make someone responsible
for the assets of the trust, their investment, and their distribution. Isn't it
enough to say that public policy is fulfilled when the trustee is found
responsible for any deviations from the fulfillment of his or her duties? Is
there really a public policy reason to make the trustee's lawyer a surety
or guarantor of trustee conduct? And even if it were desirable to add this
extra level of protection, isn't it clear that the price that is paid for that
extra protection (loss of real counsel for the trustee, breach of
confidentiality, reluctance of lawyers to serve as counsel to trustees) is far
too high?6
On that fateful Sunday morning no less an eminence than the distin-
guished, and distinguished looking, John Pickering rose to defend the
new proposal, arguing in his stentorian tones, with the grace only John
Pickering can muster, that the rule provided an opportunity for lawyers
to do something in the public interest. But it is not up to lawyers in the
representation of clients to act in the public interest. The public interest
is best served when lawyers do not attempt to represent that interest at
all, but rather when they represent their clients' interests with loyalty,
fidelity, and confidentiality.
II. JOINT REPRESENTATION
The group that addressed client confidentiality seemed to be similarly
affected by the unfortunate weather. That is the only explanation the
author can surmise would lead lawyers of otherwise good will and
independence to craft a proposal that disserves not only lawyers but their
clients as well. In addressing the issues raised as to how to handle
confidential information in a joint representation situation, the group
6. The reliance of the drafters of the proposal on these disclosures as being "im-
pliedly authorized by MRCP 1.6(a)" is troubling as well. See Recommendations, supra
note 1, at 998. That exception always has been interpreted as applying when the client is
unable to give consent, not as an exception that literally swallows the rule. See, e.g.,
ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 94 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that the
exception applies "whenever a lawyer represents a client with whom it is not possible to
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship" and providing as examples a young child in
a custody proceeding or a disabled client.)
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assembled at the Fordham Law School on that fateful Sunday morning
made the following recommendations:
After discussing the scope and terms of the representation, the lawyer
and clients should enter into an agreement, preferably in writing, about
the confidentiality of their disclosures. The discussion should include
the review of the following options...:
a. The lawyer may, in his or her discretion, disclose to each client
all information gained in the course of the representation
notwithstanding the fact that the person communicating the in-
formation subsequently requests that such information not be
disclosed.
b. The lawyer must disclose to each client all relevant information
gained in the course of the representation notwithstanding the
fact that the person communicating the information subse-
quently requests that such information not be disclosed.
c. The lawyer cannot disclose to one client any information gained
in the course of the representation from the other client without
the clients' consent.7
Although the group also opined that Option a is the "preferred
practice,"8 it is clear that both Options a and c are unacceptable. To
address Option c first, an option the group admittedly conceded to be
"strongly discouraged," 9 there is no basis for concluding that what has
been undertaken is a joint representation when the lawyer is barred from
disclosing confidential communications from one client to the other. The
first time the lawyer learns of information that, absent the undertaking
not to disclose, the lawyer would feel obliged to disclose to the other, the
lawyer will be operating under an impossible conflict of interest. Know-
ing such information, the lawyer will have no alternative but to with-
draw. Given the impossible conflict-generating potential inherent in
Option c, there is absolutely no basis for even listing it as an option. Yet,
for reasons that are inexplicable, the group voted to include it.
Option a is similarly flawed. It provides that the lawyer may "in his or
her discretion"' 1 disclose confidential information. This creates two
problems. First, as already noted at the beginning of my comments, any
time a lawyer may do something and chooses not to, the result will be
liability for the lawyer, if as a result of the non-disclosure, someone is
harmed.
Second, providing the lawyer in advance with this level of discretion
creates a conflict of interest in which the lawyer, having received
confidential information, must establish some standards for determining
when it will be shared. It is far better from the perspective of both the
clients and the lawyer to know that the information must be disclosed so
7. See Recommendations, supra note 1, at 994
8. See id. at 995.
9. See id,
10. See id at 994.
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that no one is left wondering whether some important information has
not been shared.
The only reasonable solution to the joint representation dilemma is
Option b, which provides that the lawyer must disclose to each client all
material information. This avoids the conflict of interest for the lawyer
and the anxiety that a rule either barring or simply permitting the
sharing of such information would create.
